

**BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER
AIR FORCE SPACE COMMAND**



**AIR FORCE SPACE COMMAND
INSPECTION CHECKLIST 10-11**

1 MARCH 2000

Operations

**MISSILE OPERATIONS
NUCLEAR SURETY (WING)**

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This checklist reflects command requirements for units to prepare for and conduct internal reviews.

SUMMARY OF REVISIONS

This checklist has been revised to update references and Inspection philosophy. A bar (|) indicates a revision from the previous edition.

1. References are provided for each item. Critical items have been kept to a minimum and are related to public law, safety, security, fiscal responsibility, and/or mission accomplishment.
2. This publication establishes a baseline checklist. The checklist will also be used by the Command IG during applicable assessments. Use the attached checklist as a guide only. AFSPC Cecklists will not be supplemented. Units may produce their own standalone checklists as needed to ensure an effective and thorough review of unit programs. Units are encouraged to contact the Command Functional OPR of this Checklist to recommend additions and changes deemed necessary. See [Attachment 1](#).

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Director of Operations

Attachment 1

MISSILE OPERATIONS NUCLEAR SURETY

Table A1.1. Checklist.

Mission Statement: (WING): Manage and maintain nuclear resources and programs with approved safety, security and reliability standards.			
1.1. UNIT CRITICAL ITEMS	YES	NO	N/A
NUCLEAR CONTROL ORDER PROCEDURES			
1.1.1. Do crewmembers properly process and react to nuclear control orders? (EAP STRAT Vol VIII, 2-1)			
1.1.2. Do command post controllers properly process and react to nuclear control orders? (EAP STRAT Vol IV, 1-11b)			
1.1.3. Does each LCC have a properly posted and accurate EAMB? (EAP ICBM, para 7)			
1.1.4. Are proper sealed authenticators located in the LCCs? (EAP STRAT Vol III, Appendix A)			
NUCLEAR SURETY			
1.1.5. Is unit targeting accurate for each ICBM? (Generation and Targeting ICBM {GATI} 3-2a, 3-4a)			
1.1.6. Are PLCAs/PLCB stacks verified after all on alert sorties have the upcoming revision EP cases installed? (GATI, 3-7)			
1.1.7. Is the two person control concept adhered to during all operations involving PC material? (EAP STRAT Vol III, Ch 14)			
1.1.8. Are code controllers properly maintaining split handling of code components? (SD 501-12, 3.5)			
1.1.9. Are critical components properly controlled? (SD 501-12, 5.8)			
1.1.10. Is proper security of the codes vault area maintained? SD 501-12, 3.5)			

UNIT CRITICAL ITEMS (CONT)	YES	NO	N/A
1.1.11. Is access/entry to the no-lone zone properly controlled? (SD 501-12, 5.4)			
1.1.12. Is the shielded enclosure (SE) configured so that two officer AB controller locks must be removed to gain entry? (SD 501-12, 5.4)			
1.1.13. Are only authorized coding materials/supplies used in the SE? (SD 501-12, 5.5.4)			
1.1.14. Are personnel who have access to CMCC/CMSC values prohibited from visiting the applicable LCC/LF until the values are properly validated? (SD 501-12, 5.3.3; AFI 91-114, 13.2-13.3)			
1.1.15. Do code controller teams consist of at least one controller of the same control group as the component? Are two-officer code controllers present when required? (SD 501-12, 3.6.4)			
1.1.16. Are holographic Tamper Detection Indicators (TDI) placed properly on LCC equipment? (SD 501-12, Table A8.1 and Table A9.1)			
1.1.17. Are TDIs intact? (AFI 91-104, 2.2.2)			
1.1.18. Are miscellaneous codes materials properly controlled? (SD 501-12, 3.4.3)			
1.1.19. Are code components properly controlled according to SD 501-12, Attachments 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, and 13? (SD 501-12, 5.5)			
1.1.20. Are downgraded/restricted/unqualified crew members prevented from performing alert duties? (AFSPCI 10-1202, 9.4-9.6)			
SECURITY READINESS			
1.1.21. (MAF/LCC/LF Entry Procedures) Are proper security procedures accomplished? (AFSPCI 31-1101, 5.8-6.5)			

ADMINISTRATION			
UNIT CRITICAL ITEMS (CONT)	YES	NO	N/A
1.1.22. Is the Emergency Action Book (EAMB) accurate? (EAP ICBM, para 7)			
1.1.23. Is the master EAMB posted correctly? (EAP ICBM, para 7)			
1.1.24. Are all EAMBs reproduced and controlled properly? (EAP ICBM, para 8)			
1.1.25. Is the real world Timing and Targeting Document (TATD) accurate? (GATI, 3-4a)			
1.1.26. Does the unit TATD accurately reflect information in the MAT? (GATI, 3-4a)			
1.1.27. Is the MAT updated to reflect the correct category code for sorties only after authorization? (GATI 2-4c)			
1.1.28. Are the targeting casebooks accurate? (GATI, 3-2e)			
1.1.29. Are PC material inventories accomplished as required? (EAP STRAT Vol III, Ch 14)			
1.1.30. Is PC material stored and packed properly? (EAP STRAT Vol III, Ch 14)			
1.1.31. Does the primary PC custodian ensure alternate PC custodians and users are initially trained and receive recurring training in the handling and security of PC documents? (EAP STRAT Vol III, 3-1c)			
1.1.32. Do crew members and code controllers receive initial and annual recurring nuclear surety and weapons safety training? (AFI 91-202, 10.10; AFI 91-101, 2.16)			

UNIT CRITICAL ITEMS (CONT)	YES	NO	N/A
1.1.33. Do NSI tasks in training and evaluation MPT scripts present nuclear surety stimuli and comply with HQ directives? (AFSPCI 36-2202, 3 and 4.1.8; METER, 2-1)			
1.1.34. Is Top Secret material accounted for and controlled appropriately? (AFI 31-401, para 5.10)			
1.2. UNIT NON-CRITICAL ITEMS	YES	NO	N/A
ADMINISTRATION			
1.2.1. Are all publications and technical orders affecting nuclear weapon systems properly maintained and reviewed for changes in content? (AFSPCI 36-2202, 1.2.9.2, 1.2.10.7, 1.2.11.7)			
1.2.2. Are command post controllers trained and certified? (AFSPCI 10-20701, Vol 2, 2.6, 2.8, 2.10, 2.11, 2.12)			